
INTERNAL SECURITY: THREAT OF NAXALITE INSURGENCY

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Abstract: This paper examines the internal security threat of naxalite insurgency in India. India is facing various threats of internal security for e.g. terrorism, corruption, naxalism, etc. Among these threats, naxalite insurgency emerged as a serious threat to the nation's security in the last decades. In 2006, Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh described naxalite problem as the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country. The paper is divided into three parts (one) deals with the emergence of the naxalite insurgency in India, (two) causes of the naxalism and (three) government response. The naxalism is used in the Indian context for traditional Maoism. Naxalite insurgency was started as an agrarian movement against the landlords and moneylenders. But later on it was changed into naxalite insurgence. This paper also highlights that this insurgency is inspired by the doctrines of Mao Zedong, Lenin and Karl Marx. The worst affected states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh. The naxalite insurgency has become the greatest threat to the internal security. Though India is rising as a great economic power yet at the same time it is facing several internal problems for e.g. poverty, terrorism, illiteracy, unemployment, corruption and naxalism. Starting from West Bengal naxalite insurgency spread to virgin territories. The naxalite covered territory is now called the 'Red Corridor'. Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal were the strongest leaders who strengthened the insurgency and spread their ideology of violence. This problem can be solved by addressing their socio-economic problem.

Keywords: naxalite, insurgency, internal security, doctrines.

Introduction: India is world's largest democracy and third largest economic power at the international level but at the national level India is suffering from internal problems as Bhattacharya said, "Since Independence...there has been no real change in the social, economic and political structure of our society. Zamindari is abolished, land reform laws have been passed and untouchability has been legally prohibited, and so on. But the village in most parts of India is still in the grip of the higher castes and the bigger and medium landowners. The small and marginal landowners are the landless, the backward classes and the Harijans...Yet their position continues to be miserable. Harijans are still burnt alive" [6]. India's biggest internal threat is the naxalite insurgency. The term 'Naxal' is derived from Naxalbari, a village in West Bengal. The naxalite insurgency is spreading in 40% of the country's geographical area and over 30% if its population are affected by it. The naxalites are more than four times of population than Jammu & Kashmir, Northeast and Panjab put together [18]. There were almost 28 naxalite groups in the country [24]. Presently, 16 naxalite groups are active across the nine states. Among these the People's War Group (PWG) & Maoist Communist Committee (MCC) (now MCCI-Maoist Communist Centre of India) are most prominent. They use AK-47 rifles, revolvers and guns. They are also trained in periodic military training and ambush skills [3]

"The earliest roots of the naxal movement can be traced back to the Telengana movement of 1948

where local peasants upset over inefficient land distribution rules adopted communist ideologues from the peasant movements in China to fight back against government regulation', [34]. According to Jawaid, "India's Naxalite insurgency emerged in 1967 as an uprising of armed peasants in the West Bengal town of Naxalbari, to protect the rights of poor peasants and create a classless society"[16]. In September 1968, Kanu Sanyal, the principal organizer of peasant committees wrote in his Report on the Peasant Movement in the Terai Region" that, "Ours is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, 80 per cent of whose population live in the villages. The contradiction between the people of our country and feudalism is the principal contradiction. The comprador-bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, landlords and jotedars have been carrying out their rule and exploitation through their political organisation, the Congress Party by protecting fully and developing imperialist interests and by covering up the basis of feudalism by legal coatings. So the peasants are the main force of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. Unless peasants are liberated it is impossible to liberate all the other oppressed classes. The terai peasants are part of the peasantry of our country" [26]. Naxalites used 'MWCL' formula where M stands for money, W means weapons, C means cadre, L signifies leadership. M comes from Jharkhand, W from Orissa, C from Chhattisgarh, L from Andhra Pradesh [32].

In the initial stage the insurgency was so active when it was directed by the ideologue Charu Mazumdar

(considered as the father of the insurgency) and Kanu Sanyal who were guided by Mao Zedong's ideology. Naxalites used the guerrilla warfare tactics, [2]. Justice is delivered by 'Kangaroo Courts' in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, [21]. The naxalites set up courts in the affected areas and solved their law and order problem. They have established parallel government. The naxalites organised adivasis to bring revolutionary changes, [23]. Bhatia posits that 'a large majority of the cadres...who comprise the backbone of the movement' are 'instinctual revolutionaries' [7]. It is also believed that women also participated in this insurgency, [8].

In the 1970s the naxalite insurgency was suppressed. After 1972 the movement was slowed because of the death of Charu Mazumdar. The naxalites attack on the rural landed elite, police personnel, government officials and political leaders, [4]. Now it is believed that naxalites hold 10 million hectares of forests or about a seventh of the country's total forest land in which they have their own administrative system, [13]. It is still increasing where poverty and unemployment exists.

Causes of the insurgency: India is shining country but its large section of society is still under poverty line as Paul Collier said, 'if economy is weak, the state is also likely to be weak, and rebellion is not difficult', [9]. In 1950s nearly 60% of rural households were made up of the landless, marginal holders sharecropping tenants, [29]. According to Crowley the main factors of naxalite insurgency in India are weak governing institutions, inadequate security and lack of economic development. The tribes constitute the largest portion of population. These tribes are facing extreme poverty, discrimination, acute social exploitation, economic disparities, indifference of the state institutions and political neglect. These tribal communities face social exclusion and bias which denies them equality and dignity, deprives them of their entitlement and blocks their avenues advancement, [27]. The greatest frustration is caused to the people when crimes and injustice are not punished and disputes and conflicts are not settled by the state apparatus fairly and in time, [31]. At least 90% of them are living below poverty line and their quality of living i.e. housing, access to sanitation, safe drinking water, basic tertiary education, healthcare and delivery system are in a gloomy state. According to Avinash Kumar, 'the lack of commitment to land reform and towards ending cast exploitation is responsible for such insurgency, in which the dalit landless are invariably victims, [17].

We can say that lack of infrastructure and economic development are the main causes of the naxalite insurgency in India. The benefits of globalisation has untouched the naxalite affected area. This area is still

poverty ridden. These tribal people remained isolated from the economic growth and privatisation, [2]. These tribal people do not trust the government. Mao Zedong was the primary force behind these revolutions who aimed to overthrow governmental authority through violent means. According to the National Sample Survey (NSS) one-third of the rural population lives on less than twelve rupees a day, [18]. "Poverty is the parent of revolution"- Aristotle (384 bc-322bc). Poverty is regarded as the main cause behind this naxalite insurgency. In 2004, this insurgency again increased when the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People's War Group (PWG) emerged together, [19]. At the same time poverty also motivated to insurgency.

State	% of rural poverty in naxalite affected states
Andhra Pradesh	16
All India	32
Madhya Pradesh	41
West Bengal	41
Uttar Pradesh	42
Odisha	50
Bihar	58

Source: Government of India statistics quoted in Das (2004).

The naxalite insurgency is financed by the drug trafficking, arms trade, and illegal financial transactions. In present times the naxalite collect levies of about 1500 crore of rupees every year in the name of revolution. This money is collected from politician, corrupt officers, traders, zamindars and contractors, [32].

Government Response to Naxalite insurgency: According to Article 353 the union government is responsible to protect every state against external aggression and internal disturbance. The union government directed joint operation by the police and the army in the worst affected border area among West Bengal, Bihar and Odisha. The code name of the operation was 'Operation Steeplechase'. It covered the areas Midnapur, Burdwan, Purulia and Bhabhum districts in West Bengal, Shinghbhum, Dhanbad and Santhal Parganas in Bihar and Mayurbhanj in Odisha. Several laws were made and rules and regulations have passed by the government but not implemented in a proper way for e.g. 'The SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and the elaborate rules framed there under in 1995 make it mandatory for the Union and state governments to

prevent and take action against 'atrocities' and crimes against members of the SCs and the STs' [33].

At central level, in 1991 economic reforms were introduced by the government but tribes remained unaffected from these policies. In 1993, the Constitutional 73rd Amendment Act was passed in Parliament amidst much fanfare. It was speculated that this 'landmark' Act, providing for a three-tiered structure of grassroots governance, would finally be able to provide 'power to the people' through adequate representation to women and the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (officially considered as the poorest of the poor) [3]. There are several schemes which are started by the government for e.g. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme in 200 districts but extended to 300 districts, Integrated Child Development Scheme.

"The Union Home Minister, in his statement earlier in the Lok Sabha on 1 March 2006, revealed that 26 CRPF battalions were being deputed to the central tribal belt to deal with the Naxalites. This means 26,000 officers and men, a number equalling 'the army of a small state' [33]. There is an additional Rs 15 crore per year per district from 2003-04 to 2005-06 as Special Central Assistance to fill in 'critical gaps in physical and social infrastructure in these areas' [14]. 'Operation Green Hunt' was also started but failed. CoBRA (COmmando Battalion for Resolute Action) is a specialised unit to fight against naxals. Under the Backward Districts (BDI) scheme the central government allocated Rs. 2,500 crore for the 55 naxalites affected districts. Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 (PESA) is a successful step to solve the insurgency. The government has also established Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism school to impart military training to state police personnel,[1].

At state level in Andhra Pradesh, the Reddy government also asked the police to go slow on combing operations and withdrew the offer of cash rewards for the arrest of top Naxal leaders [22]. The Andhra Pradesh government established 'Greyhounds' force. The Greyhounds training school is also established. Many rehabilitation schemes also started. In Uttar Pradesh, the Mulayam Singh Yadav government has found a novel way to tackle the Naxalite problem; instead of deploying more gun-

toting security personnel, it has adopted a humane approach by deciding to electrify Naxal-infested villages [30]. In Jharkhand, the state police reportedly adopted the 'Gill formula' – named after former police officer K.P.S Gill, who used a heavy-handed approach to flush out extremism in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s – to deal with Naxalite violence [28]. Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra government have been successful in combating the insurgency but less.

Remedies: Government at the central and state level are doing efforts to solve insurgency but these efforts are mainly force based. Government should not use force but it can solve the crisis by introducing job opportunities, effective system of governance, effective intelligent system. There is no need to use violence to resolve the insurgency but it needs to address the local problem for e.g. providing good infrastructure, school building, education facility, house building, and better communication system. At the central level the government should mobilise the resources and should pay attention to develop human resources. The centre should also established agriculture schools as it has set up agriculture universities. The centre should provide agriculture education with rural technology.

Conclusion: 'Even if the ideologues of the Maoist movement are fighting to eventually overthrow the Indian State, right now even they know that their ragged, malnutrition army, the bulk of whose soldiers have never seen a train or a bus or even a small town, are fighting only for survival', [25]. The naxalite insurgency is failed due to lack of strong party organisation. Gen. Malik in 2010 said that "The almost daily instances of disrupted communications and violence in the 'Red corridor' have brought the long-festering Maoist insurgency to the centre-stage of India's internal security threats. It has also highlighted our hollowness and incompetence to deal with the problem at the strategic, operational and tactical levels." [20] Indian government is still not successful in defeating the naxalite insurgents. Centre and state should cooperate with each other. The government should address their socio-economic problems.

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